Trial I · US v. Farah

Vol I

2024-04-22
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Day Overview

April 22, 2024 was the first day of trial in US v. Farah (File No. 22-cr-124, before Judge Nancy Brasel). The entire day was devoted to jury voir dire — individual questioning of 21 prospective jurors (with several excused for hardship or bias). Before voir dire began, defense counsel Mohring raised a significant Brady/Jencks objection: the government had disclosed over 7 gigabytes of material (approximately 30,000 pages including ~20,000 pages of bank records, ~700 pages of criminal histories, ~120 pages of interview reports, and a cooperation letter) on the Friday evening before Monday trial. Mohring moved for a continuance between jury selection and opening statements; the court deferred ruling but signaled at day's end it was unlikely to grant the relief. The court described the 41 charges to the panel — wire fraud conspiracy, 11 wire fraud counts, federal programs bribery, money laundering, and a passport fraud count — and noted the defendants pled not guilty and claimed good faith. The most significant voir dire moments: Juror 3 was excused after admitting she believed the defendants were guilty based on media coverage and could not be talked out of it; Juror 8 was excused after stating Islam was a 'false religion' and expressing uncertainty about fairness; Juror 18 was excused sua sponte after disclosing traumatic experiences with Islamic groups; and the government's challenge for cause against Juror 20 (a teacher near George Floyd Square with law enforcement skepticism) was denied. Voir dire ended at 5:06 p.m. after 21 jurors were individually questioned, with jury selection to continue the next day.

Government Strategy

This volume contains no witness testimony — it is entirely jury voir dire. The government's strategic interests here were (1) seating jurors who would credit law enforcement testimony and treat FBI agents as no more or less credible than other witnesses, (2) removing jurors who harbored anti-law-enforcement bias (particularly post-George Floyd sentiment in the Twin Cities), and (3) preserving on the record the government's position that all late Brady/Jencks disclosures were newly gathered material, not material that had been in government possession and withheld. The government agreed to strike Juror 2 (prior daycare provider with qualified bias), agreed to strike Juror 3 (explicitly stated defendants were guilty), but challenged Juror 20 (teacher near George Floyd Square with law enforcement skepticism) for cause — a motion the court denied. The government characterized the investigation as ongoing and massive ('one large conspiracy to fraudulently obtain federal child nutrition program funds') in explaining the volume of late disclosures.

Strategic Notes for Defense Counsel

- PRETRIAL PUBLICITY IS MASSIVE AND WELL-DOCUMENTED: Multiple jurors independently volunteered that media had reported the defendants took money, didn't feed children, used funds for real estate purchases, and committed fraud. This is a documented record of pervasive pretrial prejudice — useful for change of venue motions in future indictments, and for any appeal on denial of fair trial. KARE 11, WCCO, KSTP, Star Tribune, NPR, New York Times all named as sources. - LATE BRADY/JENCKS DISCLOSURE IS A RECURRING PATTERN: Government disclosed 7GB the Friday before trial, including 20,000+ pages of bank records and witness prep interview reports. Defense counsel Mohring noted this was the fourth such voluminous production in a month. Court denied continuance. Defense counsel must build in aggressive Brady/Jencks enforcement motions early in pretrial — with specific demand dates and court-ordered compliance deadlines — or face the same last-minute dump. The cooperation letter produced at defense request is particularly important to obtain and scrutinize. - RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL BIAS ARE STRUCTURAL RISKS IN THIS JURY POOL: The voir dire reveals that the Twin Cities jury pool has significant anti-Islamic bias (Juror 3 believed defendants guilty from media; Juror 8 called Islam a false religion; Juror 18 had personal trauma from Islamic groups). Court took these issues seriously and excused jurors sua sponte. However, government resisted excusing Juror 8 — suggesting government preferred keeping jurors with negative Islamic associations. Defense counsel should use voir dire to probe implicit bias rigorously and consider requesting written questionnaires with explicit questions about defendants' Somali and Islamic identity. - GOVERNMENT CHALLENGED JUROR WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT SKEPTICISM AND LOST: Juror 20 (teacher, Afro-Latino husband, George Floyd Square climate, direct racial profiling experience) was challenged for cause by government and the court denied it. This juror credited her experience with implicit bias training and evidence-based evaluation. Jurors with academic or professional training in evaluating evidence (educators, social workers, researchers) may be more skeptical of government agent testimony — a favorable profile for defense. - JARED KARY AND PAULINE ROASE IDENTIFIED AS TRIAL AGENTS: FBI Special Agent Jared Kary and Agent Pauline Roase were seated at the government table throughout trial as the designated case agents. Kary is the lead investigative agent who, per prior knowledge from later volumes, gave false testimony about a witness interview and admitted zero physical surveillance. His presence from day one as the face of the investigation makes impeachment of his trial testimony particularly high-value.

Key Evidence
Type Exhibit Description Page Challenge Opportunity
Other Court Exhibit 1 Criminal Trial Jury Questionnaire — 26-question form distributed to all prospective jurors prior to voir dire. Questions covered prior knowledge of the case, knowledge of witnesses/defendants/staff, media consumption, law enforcement bias, religious bias (Questions 23-24 on Islam/Muslims and East African communities), childcare/food program experience, financial/accounting background, and willingness to apply the law as instructed. Available in overflow room for public and media. [p. 5] The questionnaire was sealed/confidential; the juror list was also confidential. Defense teams should preserve any argument that the sealing of juror identities affected their ability to conduct adequate juror research.
Other Late Brady/Jencks Disclosure Government disclosed approximately 7 gigabytes (~30,000+ pages) of material on Friday, April 19, 2024 — the Friday evening before Monday trial commenced. Contents: ~80-90 pages of trial subpoena returns, ~120 pages of interview reports from witness prep sessions, approximately 700 pages of NCIC criminal histories of government witnesses, one cooperation letter, and approximately 20,000+ pages of bank records from grand jury subpoenas. Government characterized all as 'newly gathered material.' [p. 7] Government's claim that all material was 'newly gathered' is facially questionable: 20,000+ pages of bank records from grand jury subpoenas. The grand jury has been active for years in this case. Defense should track Bates ranges of this production and compare against grand jury subpoena dates to test government's assertion. Mohring's request for two additional days was denied de facto by the court's end-of-day signal.
Legal Rulings & Objections
Defense motion (Mohring on behalf of Mukhtar Shariff) for a continuance between jury selection and opening statements to review approximately 7GB of late-produced Brady/Jencks material. Court deferred ruling during the day, then at page 302 signaled: 'Given our time frame and the rate at which we are moving, I am unlikely to grant the relief that Mr. Mohring sought.' Court invited Mohring to bring it up again but telegraphed denial. — The court allowed trial to proceed with defense counsel inadequately prepared to address approximately 20,000 pages of newly produced bank records and 120 pages of witness interview reports. This is preserved error if any of the late-disclosed material was material exculpatory evidence. Defense counsel should review what was in that production — specifically the cooperation letter and interview reports from witness prep sessions, which could reveal prior inconsistent statements or undisclosed agreements. [p. 7]
Government challenge for cause as to Juror 2 (51-year-old, prior daycare provider for 7 years, expressed qualified bias — stated 'I might be a little biased' about child nutrition fraud). Defense agreed to strike. Court excused. — Prior childcare/food program experience is a consistent bias risk factor in this case. Any juror with personal investment in child nutrition programs is likely to be sympathetic to government's narrative that defendants harmed children. [p. ~57]
Court excused Juror 3 sua sponte after juror admitted she believed defendants were guilty based on TV news, stated 'I would have to hear the evidence in order to be changed — my mind to be changed,' and when court pressed whether she could be talked out of her view, replied 'I don't think so, no.' — Confirms the extent of negative media coverage of the Feeding Our Future case in the Twin Cities. The juror's framing — that defendants would need to prove innocence — inverted the presumption. Multiple jurors across voir dire referenced TV news coverage (KSTP, WCCO, KARE 11) as their source. Extensive pretrial publicity is an established fact of record. [p. ~59]
Defense challenge for cause (government agreed) as to Juror 2 — prior daycare provider who said she 'might be a little biased' but attempted to rehabilitate. Court noted she was 'working too hard to overcome' and granted the motion. — The court used a 'working too hard to overcome' standard for borderline-rehabilitated bias — relevant to future Batson/cause challenges. [p. ~57]
Defense motion (context unclear — appears related to Juror 8, who stated Islam is a 'false religion'). Government partially resisted, arguing it was a 'close call' and that many devout religious believers hold similar views about other religions. Court granted defense motion, citing its perception that the juror was 'working too hard to overcome' and her mannerisms. — Court showed willingness to excuse jurors whose religious views toward Islam created appearance of bias even if the juror verbally committed to fairness. Government's partial resistance to excusing a juror who called Islam a 'false religion' is noteworthy — government preferred to keep this juror, suggesting government was comfortable with jurors holding negative views of Islamic defendants. [p. ~131]
Government challenge for cause as to Juror 20 (public school teacher near George Floyd Square, Afro-Latino husband, described 'climate of suspicion' toward law enforcement based on personal racial profiling experiences). Defense (Schleicher) opposed, arguing juror gave unequivocal 'yes' twice when asked if she could be fair to law enforcement. Court denied government's motion, ruling juror's demeanor showed she could judge the case on the evidence. — Court denied the government's attempt to remove a juror with law enforcement credibility skepticism. This ruling is strategically significant: the court drew a line between general anti-police sentiment (excusable) and a thoughtful, evidence-based approach to credibility (not disqualifying). Defense should track whether this juror was ultimately seated. [p. 286]
Court excused Juror 18 sua sponte after juror disclosed: (1) Islamic group overthrew Trinidad and Tobago government in 1990; (2) close cousin joined an Islamic group and died along with her children within the last five years. Juror stated 'I would still try to be fair, but those experiences are still lingering in the back of my mind.' — Court was appropriately protective of defendants' rights here. However, the fact that these deeply anti-Islamic experiences came out through routine voir dire questioning — with no challenge from either party before the court acted — suggests defense counsel were monitoring for these disclosures and the court was alert to the issue. [p. 254]
Court excused Juror 10 via sidebar note for mental health/anxiety triggered by voir dire environment. — Administrative/housekeeping. No strategic significance. [p. 214]
Court excused Juror 13 via private sidebar for significant mental health issues that would preclude extended courtroom service. — Administrative/housekeeping. No strategic significance. [p. 185]
Court disclosed on the record that her husband is a Stinson law firm partner, in connection with Juror 21 having worked with Stinson on DigiKey contracts. Court determined this did not create a recusal issue. — Preserved on the record. Potentially relevant if any Stinson attorneys had involvement in the case or if there are future recusal arguments. [p. 300]
Prior Defense Performance

This was voir dire — defense counsel did not examine witnesses and had no traditional cross-examination role. Assessment of defense performance is therefore limited to: (1) their voir dire advocacy, (2) their Brady/Jencks disclosure objection, and (3) their challenge/response to cause motions. On the Brady issue, Mohring's objection was well-articulated and preserved — he noted specifically that the late-disclosed materials included exculpatory material. However, the defense failed to press harder for an actual ruling (rather than a deferral) and allowed the court to kick the issue to after jury selection, by which time leverage was gone. On challenges for cause: defense successfully challenged Jurors 2 and 8 (Islamic bias); defense appropriately opposed the government's challenge to Juror 20 (law enforcement skepticism) and won. Defense did not appear to challenge several other jurors with meaningful pretrial exposure to the case who claimed they could be fair — whether this reflected a strategic judgment or inadequate voir dire preparation is unclear. The court's individual-questioning voir dire format limited counsel's ability to observe juror demeanor and follow up beyond sidebar requests. One missed opportunity: no defense counsel appears to have followed up on the juror (Juror 15) who stated they knew someone had 'pled guilty to wire fraud' — that juror remained in the pool, and the guilty plea of a cooperator being known to a juror before trial is a serious contamination issue.