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Trial I · US v. Farah

Vol XIX

2024-05-20
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Day Overview

Volume XIX covers Monday, May 20, 2024. The day began out of the presence of the jury with a significant pretrial dispute: defense counsel Birrell moved to exclude or delay 47 new government exhibits (including 37 new summary/pivot tables from forensic accountants) disclosed the prior evening at 8:09 p.m., raising Sixth Amendment confrontation and due process concerns. The court allowed Parks to testify but agreed to postpone forensic accountant Pauline Roase to the following morning to give defense time to review the late disclosures. FBI Agent Brian Pitzen concluded his testimony under cross from Brandt and Schleicher (who drew admissions that some food was legitimately purchased and distributed, that Pitzen had no knowledge of Bushra Wholesalers' books, employees, or tax records, and that he never visited the warehouse). IRS Special Agent Joshua Parks then took the stand for an extended direct examination consuming the rest of the day, presenting his N-series charts comparing attendance roster names against Minnesota public school enrollment records for 20 districts totaling 193,249 students, showing extremely low match rates (e.g., 4 of 999 for Bloomington, 62 of 1,094 for Al-Ihsan/St. Paul), persistent identical rosters copied month-to-month and across multiple geographically dispersed sites, and fictitious or absurd names ('Friday Donations,' 'Serious Problem,' 'Britishy Melony,' 'Getsaname Hester,' 'Jeffery Dharmer,' 'John Doe') appearing in rosters submitted to Feeding Our Future and Partners in Nutrition for reimbursement. The most significant moment of the entire volume — and arguably of Trial 1 — occurred at page 4727: after Parks's approximately four-hour direct examination, the Court asked 'Cross-examination?' and every defense attorney declined. Parks received zero cross-examination.

Government Strategy

The government used this day to methodically build its roster-fraud case through three layers of evidence: (1) completing FBI Special Agent Pitzen's cross, redirect, and recross on text message evidence tying defendants to cash and overseas money transfers vastly exceeding food invoices; (2) calling records custodians from Old National Bank and Bank of America to establish the interstate wire element for specific counts; and (3) most significantly, presenting IRS Special Agent Joshua Parks for a lengthy direct examination spanning roughly 120 transcript pages, presenting the N-series summary charts comparing attendance rosters submitted for reimbursement against public school enrollment records. The government's narrative through Parks was that the rosters were fabricated — populated with fictitious, duplicated, and geographically impossible names — and were copied wholesale across unrelated sites and time periods to fraudulently inflate and support reimbursement claims.

Strategic Notes for Defense Counsel
Witnesses
Brian Pitzen
FBI Special Agent and lead text-message analyst for the investigation; previously testified on direct about Abdiaziz Farah's cell phone, text messages, and site visits.
FBI Government
Direct Examination

Pitzen had already completed his direct examination in a prior volume. On this day he was subject to cross, redirect, and recross only.

Cross-Examination

Brandt (for Hayat Nur) briefly admitted defense exhibits D8-36 and D8-25 (screenshots of text messages from the extracted phone in their native format). Schleicher (for Said Farah) conducted the most substantive cross: he established that Pitzen acknowledged some food was legitimately distributed, that food invoices in the millions of dollars appeared in the records, that a stop-pay was in effect around April–June 2021, that Pitzen never visited Bushra Wholesalers' warehouse, never reviewed Bushra's corporate tax returns, never interviewed Bushra employees, and had no knowledge of Bushra Wholesalers as an entity. Ian Birrell established that Pitzen was unaware of the total dollar amount of food supplier invoices to Empire Cuisine & Market, and that emails and physical mail could contain invoices he never reviewed. Cotter extracted the admission that Pitzen had no independent knowledge of the source of the cash in the shoebox photo, given that Empire Cuisine operated a hawala/money-transfer business.

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Pitzen acknowledged 'there's no question that some food was distributed' in connection with this case. — Government's own FBI agent concedes legitimate food distribution occurred, undermining a purely fictitious fraud theory. [p. 4544]
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Pitzen admitted he never went to the Bushra Wholesalers warehouse at 3004 Pillsbury Avenue, never reviewed Bushra's books or tax returns, and never interviewed any Bushra employees, including Idriss Omar. — The government's key fact witness has no knowledge of one of the central food supplier entities in the case, leaving significant gaps in the investigation of actual food costs. [p. 4562]
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Pitzen admitted he did not know the total dollar amount of food supplier invoices to Empire Cuisine & Market, and that invoices could have been emailed or physically mailed without his knowledge. — The scope of legitimate food procurement may be far larger than what was shown to the jury through the cherry-picked text message invoices. [p. 4576]
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Cotter elicited that Pitzen had no independent knowledge of the source of the $270,000 shoebox cash photo, given Empire's hawala operation. — The most damaging visual exhibit (shoebox of cash) is not conclusively tied to program fraud proceeds. [p. 4579]
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Defense Exhibit D5-318 (food warehouse video) admitted under Rule 106 rule of completeness after Schleicher argued the government's thumbnail image in H-59 was incomplete. Pitzen acknowledged the video showed 'several boxes' of food (bananas, onions, potatoes) in a storage location. — Corroborates legitimate food storage and distribution operations; admitted through a government witness under the completeness doctrine. [p. 4578]
Vulnerabilities Pitzen's knowledge was siloed to Abdiaziz Farah's text messages and limited site visits; he admitted zero knowledge of food supplier invoices beyond what appeared in texts, had no involvement with the Bushra warehouse search, never reviewed corporate records or tax returns, and conceded food was distributed. The government on redirect tried to rehabilitate by showing the food invoice amounts were dwarfed by the larger financial transfers (to Kenya, for truck tires, for textiles), but this comparison does not establish that no food was served — it only establishes that large sums also flowed to other purposes. The redirect's China truck tire invoice ($169,250) and textile invoice ($190,000) were devastating but could be addressed by arguing the hawala money-transfer business as an alternate source for those funds.
For Defense Counsel Defense counsel should consider whether Bushra Wholesalers' actual books, tax returns, and supplier invoices can be introduced to show the full scope of food procurement. The hawala/Taaj money-transfer business is an important alternate explanation for large overseas transfers that was only briefly touched by Cotter. A defense forensic accountant could present the total food procurement costs to counter the government's selective invoice comparison.
Brianna Van Horn
Community Banking Operations Partner Lead at Old National Bank, called as records custodian to establish that specific checks processed through Old National accessed servers outside Minnesota, satisfying the interstate commerce element of wire fraud counts 21, 22, 26, and 32.
Other Government Government
Direct Examination

Van Horn explained Old National's check-processing system (via FIS servers in Little Rock, Arkansas) and authenticated four checks tied to specific counts: L-21 ($118,258.04 from Empire Cuisine to Bushra Wholesales, Count 21), L-22 ($500,000 from Empire Cuisine to Johnson-Reiland Builders, Count 22), L-26 ($250,000 starter check from Abdiaziz Farah's account to Johnson-Reiland, Count 26), and L-32 ($1,041,986.08 cashier's check from Empire Enterprises to Trademark Title Services, Count 32). She confirmed each check accessed Arkansas servers when deposited.

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Check L-32: $1,041,986.08 cashier's check from Empire Enterprises to Trademark Title Services, dated July 7, 2021, for apparent real estate purchase at Candy Cove Trail. — This is a very large check suggesting real property acquisition funded with program proceeds, directly relevant to the government's money-laundering narrative. [p. 4588]
Cross-Examination

No cross-examination. The Court asked 'Any cross-examination? No cross?' and dismissed the witness immediately after direct.

Vulnerabilities Van Horn's testimony was narrow — she only established the interstate nexus via Arkansas servers. She had no knowledge of the underlying transactions or whether the payees were legitimate. The construction/remodel check to Johnson-Reiland and the Candy Cove Trail real estate purchase could have legitimate explanations that were not explored. The defense failed to probe whether these were proceeds of fraud or legitimate business expenditures.
For Defense Counsel Defense counsel should investigate Johnson-Reiland Builders (construction) and the Trademark Title Services/Candy Cove Trail real estate transaction to determine if these can be explained as legitimate business expenses or investments unrelated to program fraud. The mere fact that large checks were written does not establish they represent fraud proceeds.
Lonnie Mills
Assistant Vice-President and Corporate Representative for Bank of America, called as records custodian to authenticate one cashier's check (L-31, $250,000, Mukhtar Shariff to Ikram Y. Mohamed, Count 31) and establish the interstate nexus.
Other Government Government
Direct Examination

Mills explained Bank of America's cashier's check procedures, confirmed L-31 was a $250,000 cashier's check purchased by Mukhtar Shariff at the Edina branch on June 9, 2021, paid to Ikram Y. Mohamed, deposited at the Uptown branch, and that both transactions accessed servers outside Minnesota.

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Cashier's check purchased by Mukhtar Shariff (the signer on an Afrique business account) for $250,000 payable to Ikram Y. Mohamed on June 9, 2021. — Ties Mukhtar Shariff directly to a large cash transfer in the context of Count 31; the use of a cashier's check requires verified identification. [p. 4595]
Cross-Examination

Goetz cross-examined on the mechanics of the check — specifically that identification could be an account card with PIN, not necessarily a photo ID — and elicited that Mills identified the Edina branch from both the printed check and his internal bank research. Mills was a competent and professional witness and the cross did not significantly impeach him.

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Mills conceded that identification at Bank of America can include using an account card and PIN, not only a photo ID. — Marginal: reduces the certainty that Mukhtar Shariff personally appeared at the Edina branch and presented photo ID. [p. 4597]
Vulnerabilities Mills was a narrow records custodian; he had no knowledge of the purpose of the $250,000 payment to Ikram Y. Mohamed or whether it related to food program fraud. Who is Ikram Y. Mohamed and what was the payment for? That line was not explored.
For Defense Counsel Identify Ikram Y. Mohamed and determine the nature and legitimacy of that payment. If it was a legitimate business or personal transaction, this undermines the government's characterization of it as fraud proceeds.
Joshua Parks
IRS Criminal Investigation Special Agent (joined July 2023, graduated training February 2024 — a brand-new agent with only 3 months of post-training experience at the time of trial) who was assigned to analyze attendance rosters and compare them to Minnesota public school enrollment records; creator of the N-series summary charts (N-124 through N-142).
IRS/Forensic Government
Direct Examination

Parks presented an extensive direct examination spanning transcript pages 4608 to 4727, offering and admitting numerous N-series summary charts. He testified about: (1) communications between defendants and Kara Lomen (Executive Director of Partners in Nutrition, a private sponsor) regarding roster submissions, including the H-53l text chain and Lomen's 'I will turn off the errors so you can enter the meal counts and info, but we need to get them in ASAP before anyone notices. LOL' message; (2) N-124 (Summary Schedule of School District Enrollment, 193,249 students across 20 districts); (3) N-125 and N-125a through h (comparisons of specific roster emails to school district records, showing very low match rates); (4) N-126 (Dar Al-Farooq time-series analysis showing identical names across January-October 2021 rosters); (5) N-127, N-128, N-129, N-130 (cross-site comparisons showing 99% overlap between Plymouth and Dar Al-Farooq names, 73.2% overlap between Cedar Cultural and Dar Al-Farooq, 73% overlap between Apple Valley/Scott Park and Dar Al-Farooq, and 122 identical names across five sites simultaneously including three Owatonna sites 60 miles from Minneapolis); and (6) N-139, N-140, N-141, N-142 (tracking fictitious names 'Getsaname Hester,' 'Angel Albino,' 'Britishy Melony,' and 'Serious Problem' across 16-27 different roster instances over the full year 2021, including in Feeding Our Future's own physical records and Partners in Nutrition's sponsor records).

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Parks is a brand-new IRS agent with only 3 months of post-training experience at the time of trial (joined July 2023, graduated training February 2024, trial in May 2024). He joined this case 'as a new agent in February of this year' and acknowledged he was 'still in training status.' — Parks has virtually no independent investigative experience. He has never testified in a prior case, has never conducted an independent investigation, and was essentially handed charts to create by more senior agents. His foundational assumptions about what the program required were derived entirely from others, not from his own regulatory expertise. [p. 4608]
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Parks described rosters as documents that 'are used to facilitate the claims reimbursement process. They're submitted alongside claims for reimbursement.' He never distinguished between SFSP open sites (where no roster is required) and closed enrolled sites, and never addressed whether the sites at issue were open or closed enrolled. — This is the central regulatory flaw in Parks's entire analysis. SFSP open sites serve any child who appears — no enrollment, no roster, no individual identification required. If the sites analyzed were open SFSP sites, comparing roster names to school enrollment records is methodologically meaningless because open sites were never required to maintain rosters and could serve children not enrolled in public school (homeschooled, in private school, pre-K, or simply not yet school-aged). Parks never disclosed whether he reviewed USDA regulations, the applicable site agreements, or MDE's program guidance on this distinction. [p. 4610]
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Parks described Kara Lomen as 'the executive director with Partners in Quality Care, also known as Partners in Nutrition' — correctly identifying her as a private sponsor executive, not an MDE employee. — Parks himself correctly identifies Lomen as a private sponsor, not an MDE official. This is significant because the government's use of Lomen's texts and emails (including 'I will turn off the errors...LOL') as evidence of defendants' fraud must be understood in light of the fact that the person controlling the submission system was an uncharged private sponsor executive who has never been interviewed by the FBI. [p. 4963]
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Parks testified that comparison of the Bloomington schools roster (999 names, attached to Mukhtar Shariff's email, subject 'Bloomington school list') to Bloomington Public School enrollment records showed only 4 matches out of 999. — Government argues this proves the roster is fabricated. However, Parks never established that the sites at issue were required to serve only children enrolled in the Bloomington school district, or only children enrolled in any public school. SFSP open sites serve any child in a low-income area — including children in private schools, charter schools, homeschool programs, pre-K programs, and children of immigrants not yet enrolled in public school. In a community with large Somali and East African immigrant populations, a significant percentage of children may not yet be enrolled in public school at all. [p. 4651]
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Parks found that 514 of 519 Plymouth Academy roster names (99%) also appeared on the Dar Al-Farooq (Bloomington) roster for the same period, and that 733 of 1,001 Cedar Cultural Center names (73.2%) appeared at Dar Al-Farooq in April 2021, and 734 of 1,003 Apple Valley/Scott Park names appeared at Dar Al-Farooq in March-April 2021, and 122 identical names appeared simultaneously at all five sites (Dar Al-Farooq, Cedar Cultural, Parkview, Woodbridge, Cedar Run) in April 2021. — This cross-site duplication is the most powerful evidence in Parks's testimony. Unlike the school-enrollment comparison (which has the regulatory flaw noted above), the fact that the same named children are supposedly eating snacks and suppers at Dar Al-Farooq in Bloomington and Cedar Cultural in Minneapolis simultaneously, or at sites in Owatonna 60 miles away simultaneously, is a direct contradiction of physical possibility. This evidence is very difficult to explain innocently. [p. 4681]
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Fictitious and absurd names on rosters submitted to Feeding Our Future and Partners in Nutrition: 'Friday Donations,' 'Serious Problem,' 'Unique Problem (read comment),' 'Britishy Melony,' 'Getsaname Hester,' 'Angel Albino,' 'Jeffery Dharmer age 10,' 'John Doe,' 'Flavor Doe,' 'Patience Doe,' 'Fortunata Mozotomas,' 'Rgian Pumqr.' 'Serious Problem' appeared in 27 separate roster instances from January through December 2021 across Dar Al-Farooq, Apple Valley, Cedar Cultural, and Owatonna sites. 'Getsaname Hester' appeared in 16 instances including in Feeding Our Future's own physical handwritten packet records. — The presence of obviously fictitious names (Jeffrey Dahmer reference, placeholder text like 'Serious Problem,' 'Unique Problem') embedded in rosters submitted to the sponsor for reimbursement is extremely difficult to explain innocently. These names did not arise from a COVID waiver or open-site regulatory interpretation. This evidence of fabricated roster entries is the most damaging in the volume. It appeared in the sponsor's own records, not just in emails between defendants. [p. 4675]
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Mukhtar Shariff's email (C-346) to claims@feedingourfuturemn.org, with Abdi Nur BCC'd (meaning FOF would not know Nur received it), attached a roster of approximately 3,500 names including 'Getsaname Hester,' 'Angel Albino,' 'Britishy Melony,' 'Rgian Pumqr,' and 'Serious Problem,' claimed 92,400 meals for September 2021, and sought $489,468.85 — corresponding to Count 8 of the indictment. — This ties the fictitious names directly to a specific charged count and a specific dollar amount, and shows the BCC to Abdi Nur as evidence of coordination. [p. 4726]
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Lomen's September 13, 2021 text to Abdiaziz Farah: 'I will turn off the errors so you can enter the meal counts and info, but we need to get them in ASAP before anyone notices. LOL' — preceded by Farah boasting he had 'mastered the rosters' by getting apartment managers to supply current resident lists 'with all details. All minors with DOB. Now that's an intelligent move.' — The government used this exchange as evidence of knowing falsification of rosters. The defense's best response is to argue that (1) Lomen, not defendants, controlled the submission system; (2) Lomen's 'turning off errors' is ambiguous conduct by an uncharged sponsor executive; and (3) the 'I mastered the rosters' text could be interpreted as obtaining legitimate resident information for open SFSP sites. However, 'sites we haven't but given out food' language in the same chain is highly damaging. [p. 4617]
Cross-Examination

ZERO cross-examination. After Mr. Ebert said 'I have no further questions,' the Court asked 'Cross-examination. No cross?' and immediately excused the witness. This is the most significant missed opportunity in Trial 1. Parks spent approximately four hours testifying and was never asked a single question by any of the seven defense attorneys representing eight defendants.

Vulnerabilities Parks has devastating vulnerabilities that were never explored due to the complete absence of cross-examination. The critical failures are: (1) Parks has only 3 months of post-training experience and was explicitly 'still in training status' — he had never led an investigation and was assigned to assist on this case; (2) Parks never testified that he reviewed any USDA regulations, program rules, or the specific agreements governing whether the sites at issue were SFSP open or closed enrolled sites — the entire school-enrollment comparison analysis rests on the unstated assumption that children served must be enrolled in local public schools, which is flatly wrong for SFSP open sites; (3) Parks never disclosed his methodology for name-matching — whether he used exact full-name matches, partial matches, phonetic matches, or some other standard; different children with the same common name (e.g., there are thousands of Muhammads and Fatimas in Minneapolis) could legitimately produce matches or mismatches; (4) Parks never addressed the COVID pandemic waivers, under which sites could distribute packaged meals for pickup by parents and guardians without any on-site attendance tracking — meaning rosters could legitimately include children who never appeared at a specific meal site but were enrolled in the program; (5) the school district records Parks obtained covered only 20 of the roughly 330+ Minnesota public school districts, and covered only public school students — children in charter schools, private schools (including Islamic schools, which would be disproportionately represented in the Muslim community at issue), homeschool programs, pre-K programs, and recently arrived refugees not yet enrolled would not appear in Parks's database of 193,249 names; (6) Parks never testified that he reviewed whether any of the named children in the rosters were real individuals outside the public school system; (7) the 'peculiar names' evidence (Serious Problem, etc.) while compelling, was never cross-examined on chain of custody or the possibility that these were IT system placeholder entries for incomplete records rather than deliberate fabrications; (8) Parks was relying on Kara Lomen's operational guidance (e.g., G-241, G-136) as his understanding of what the program required — but Lomen's guidance reflected the sponsor's internal policies, not necessarily actual USDA regulations, and the two could differ; (9) Parks never testified about the actual meal claims submitted — he analyzed only rosters, not whether meals were actually purchased and distributed; there is a gap between a flawed roster and a fraudulent claim for meals never served; (10) in Trial 2, Parks admitted under cross that he did not review USDA regulations and relied solely on MDE witness representations.
For Defense Counsel Defense counsel should prepare an expert to challenge Parks's methodology on multiple grounds: (a) the regulatory framework for SFSP open sites does not require rosters, making the school-enrollment comparison irrelevant to open sites; (b) the 193,249 school district records dramatically undercount the eligible child population (charter schools, private/Islamic schools, pre-K, refugees, homeschooled children); (c) Parks should be required to produce his matching algorithm — were 'Serious Problem' entries system errors or deliberate fabrications?; (d) the Lomen communications (particularly 'turn off the errors') should be cross-examined on whether Lomen's internal sponsor policy can be conflated with federal program requirements; (e) the geographic impossibility evidence (same children at multiple sites simultaneously) is the strongest government evidence and the most difficult to rebut — Defense counsel should focus on whether it can be explained by shared population databases used for open-site enrollment rather than per-meal tracking; (f) Parks's inexperience (3 months post-training) and derivative knowledge (everything he knows about program rules came from MDE or other agents, not from independent regulatory research) make him vulnerable to a sustained Daubert or Rule 702 challenge to his summary chart opinions.
Key Evidence
Type Exhibit Description Page Challenge Opportunity
Data/Summary Gov. Ex. N-124 Summary Schedule of School District Enrollment — aggregated database of 193,249 student names from 20 Minnesota public school districts created by Parks. [p. 4634] Dramatically underrepresents the full eligible child population. Excludes all charter school students, private/parochial/Islamic school students, pre-K children, homeschooled children, and recently arrived refugees not yet enrolled. For communities with large immigrant populations, this exclusion could be substantial. Parks never established the total child population eligible to receive SFSP meals in any site's service area.
Data/Summary Gov. Ex. N-125 and N-125a through h Summary charts comparing roster names from emails sent by defendants (E-1 through E-96) to public school enrollment records for relevant districts. Key comparisons: Bloomington 4 of 999; Shakopee 40 of 1,556; Al-Ihsan/St. Paul 62 of 1,094; Tot Park/Centennial 7 of 2,505; All Names/All Districts 177 of 3,027; Faribault 266 of 1,983; Albright/Minneapolis 138 of 810; La Cruz/St. Cloud 11 of 169. [p. 4643] Entire analysis is invalid for SFSP open sites, which serve any child under 18 regardless of school enrollment. The comparison to public school records excludes large portions of the actual eligible population. Parks never disclosed his name-matching methodology. Parks never verified whether any unmatched roster name corresponds to a real child outside the public school system.
Data/Summary Gov. Ex. N-126 Dar Al-Farooq time-series comparison across five months (Jan, Feb, Mar-Apr, Sep, Oct 2021) showing identical 1,082 names in the same order across all five rosters, with later months adding names at the bottom. [p. 4671] For a closed enrolled site, a stable roster is actually expected if the same children participate. The key question not addressed: were these open or closed sites? For open sites, no roster was required at all and the presence of a copied list is less significant. The 'all boxes checked' observation could reflect a data entry pattern for packaged meal pickup programs where daily individual check-ins were not collected.
Data/Summary Gov. Ex. N-127, N-128, N-129, N-130 Cross-site overlap analyses: N-127 shows 99% (514/519) name overlap between Plymouth Academy and Dar Al-Farooq in same period; N-128 shows 73.2% (733/1,001) overlap between Cedar Cultural and Dar Al-Farooq in April 2021; N-129 shows 73% (734/1,003) overlap between Apple Valley/Scott Park and Dar Al-Farooq in March-April 2021; N-130 shows 122 identical names appearing simultaneously at five sites (Dar Al-Farooq, Cedar Cultural, Parkview, Woodbridge, Cedar Run) in April 2021, with Owatonna sites 60+ miles from Minneapolis. [p. 4681] The defense should investigate whether these were SFSP open sites and whether the rosters were intended as enrollment rosters for program administration purposes (not per-meal attendance records). Under COVID waivers, meals could be packaged for pickup and distributed anywhere — a child 'enrolled' at one site might legitimately receive packaged meals at a different distribution point. However, the sheer magnitude of overlap (99%, 73%) across the entire roster is extremely difficult to explain on this theory. The most honest defense position is to focus on the chain of custody of the rosters and whether they were actually submitted as part of claims (as opposed to internal administrative records).
Data/Summary Gov. Ex. N-139, N-140, N-141, N-142 Individual name tracking charts for 'Getsaname Hester' (16 instances), 'Angel Albino' (17 instances), 'Britishy Melony' (14 instances), and 'Serious Problem' (27 instances, Jan through Dec 2021) across emails between defendants and in Feeding Our Future physical records and Partners in Nutrition sponsor records. [p. 4701] The defense should challenge whether 'Serious Problem,' 'Unique Problem,' etc. were IT system error codes or placeholders that the MyFoodProgram software inserted for incomplete records, rather than names manually entered by defendants. Parks never investigated this possibility. Chain of custody for the 'handwritten packets' from FOF should be scrutinized — who created them and when?
Document Gov. Ex. H-53l Text exchange between Abdiaziz Farah (green) and Kara Lomen (blue) on September 13, 2021. Farah: 'So I have mastered the rosters...The apartment manager got me all the current residents with all details. All minors with DOB.' Lomen: 'I will turn off the errors so you can enter the meal counts and info, but we need to get them in ASAP before anyone notices. LOL.' Farah: 'So how do we enter the meal counts for the sites we haven't but given out food.' [p. 4614] Kara Lomen (who controls the sponsor-side claim submission system) has never been charged, never been interviewed by the FBI, and never testified. The defense argument is that the person with actual control over what was submitted — Lomen — was a cooperating private sponsor executive, not defendants, and that defendants may have been working under Lomen's direction without fully understanding the regulatory implications. However, Farah's own text asking 'how do we enter the meal counts for the sites we haven't but given out food' is a near-direct admission. The defense must be prepared to contextualize this exchange carefully.
Document Gov. Ex. G-241 Email from Kara Lomen (forwarded by Abdiaziz Farah to defendants including Abdiwahab Aftin) dated December 2, 2021, stating program rules: 'You should only be serving meals to children that are enrolled in your after-school program and on your roster.' [p. 4624] This email reflects Lomen's interpretation of the program requirements for her closed enrolled CACFP/after-school sites. It may not accurately reflect USDA regulations for SFSP open sites, which have different requirements. The government's use of a private sponsor's internal guidance to establish 'federal requirements' conflates sponsor policy with actual federal regulations. Parks never identified which specific USDA regulations or federal statutes impose the requirements Lomen describes.
Document Gov. Ex. E-111 Thumb drive containing enrollment records from 20 Minnesota public school districts totaling 193,249 students. [p. 4632] Covers only 20 of approximately 330+ Minnesota public school districts, and only public schools. Excludes charter schools, private schools (including the many Islamic schools serving the Somali-American community), pre-K programs, and homeschooled or unenrolled children.
Document Gov. Ex. C-346 Email from Mukhtar Shariff to claims@feedingourfuturemn.org (BCC to Abdi Nur), dated October 21, 2021, attaching Dar Al-Farooq Attendance September (approximately 3,500 names including fictitious names), claiming 92,400 meals totaling $489,468.85, corresponding to Count 8. [p. 4726] The BCC to Nur does not necessarily evidence concealment; BCC is routinely used for operational coordination. Defense would argue Shariff was unaware of the fictitious names in a roster he did not personally create.
Legal Rulings & Objections
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Defense motion by Birrell (for Abdiaziz Farah) to exclude or delay 47 new government exhibits (including 37 new summary/pivot tables) disclosed the evening before trial at 8:09 p.m., raising Rule 16, due process, and Sixth Amendment confrontation grounds. Court declined to exclude but allowed defense to have the rest of the day to review disclosures before forensic accountant Pauline Roase would testify, starting the following morning. — Court showed willingness to give defense time to prepare for late-disclosed summary exhibits, but was not willing to exclude them. This pattern of late government disclosure should be documented for appellate purposes. Defense counsel should request a firm discovery cutoff with automatic exclusion remedy early in the proceedings. [p. 4523]
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Court overruled government's objection of 'beyond the scope' during Schleicher's cross of Pitzen regarding whether Pitzen had reviewed invoices from food suppliers other than those shown in text messages. — Court allowed the defense to probe gaps in the government's investigation even when the government tried to confine cross to the scope of direct. [p. 4562]
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Defense Exhibit D5-318 (food warehouse video from Said Farah's Cellebrite) admitted under Federal Rule 106 (rule of completeness) over initial government foundation objection, after Schleicher argued it was the video corresponding to a thumbnail in Government Exhibit H-59. — Rule 106 is a powerful tool for the defense to require admission of exculpatory portions of materials the government introduces in part. Defense counsel should use Rule 106 aggressively for any government exhibit showing partial communications or partial footage. [p. 4577]
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Court flagged that some exhibits admitted through Parks — specifically emails from Google — should be clarified as conditionally admitted or fully admitted, given the Bell findings requirement (United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432 — authentication/hearsay for business records). Court asked parties to advise clerk. — The government's email exhibits admitted through Parks may face authentication and hearsay challenges. Defense counsel should investigate whether proper business record foundations were laid for these Google-produced emails and whether they qualify under FRE 803(6) or the Stored Communications Act. [p. 4648]
Prior Defense Performance

The defense's performance on this day has a clear bifurcation: competent and at times effective on Pitzen's cross, and catastrophically deficient on Parks. On Pitzen, Schleicher (for Said Farah) conducted the best cross of the day — methodically establishing legitimate food procurement, the reimbursement structure, the stop-pay gap, Pitzen's near-total ignorance of Bushra Wholesalers, and the scope of food purchases beyond what the government showed the jury. Ian Birrell effectively supplemented by establishing that Pitzen had no knowledge of total supplier invoices. Cotter's hawala question was brief but strategically important. However, all of these defense attorneys then collectively failed to cross-examine Joshua Parks on a single question. Parks presented approximately four hours of direct examination containing multiple profound methodological flaws — the core problem that SFSP open sites require no rosters and serve children not enrolled in public school; Parks's three-month inexperience; his failure to review USDA regulations; his failure to account for non-public-school children in the communities served; his use of a 20-district public school database to represent the total eligible child population; and his failure to investigate whether 'Serious Problem' and similar entries were IT placeholder codes rather than deliberate fabrications. None of this was tested. The cross-site overlap evidence (N-127, N-128, N-129, N-130) and the fictitious name evidence (N-139 through N-142) are the government's most powerful proof of fabrication, yet no defense attorney asked a single question about Parks's methodology, his qualifications, his regulatory knowledge, his database completeness, or any alternative explanation for the patterns he observed. This is the largest single missed opportunity in Trial 1.